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Following the Sandy Hook school shooting in December of 2012, the state of New York took the 
increased public support for gun control measures as an opportunity to amend its existing assault 
weapons ban, creating the New York Secure Ammunition and Firearms (SAFE) Act of 2013. 
This paper focuses on the SAFE Act provision that creates a reporting requirement for mental 
health professionals, and compares it to existing reporting requirements for health care 
professionals in other contexts, including the reporting of communicable diseases, individuals 
considered medically unfit to drive, cases of suspected child abuse, and of pregnant women who 
use illegal drugs. The SAFE Act’s misguided attempt at protecting public health and safety 
through this reporting requirement does not meet the five criteria outlined by Childress et al. 
(effectiveness, necessity, least infringement, benefits proportional to harms, and justifiable to the 
public) needed for a public health intervention that conflicts with moral considerations. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
The Sandy Hook school shooting in December of 2012 killed twenty-six people, twenty of them 
children. Though this was not the only occurrence of fatal gun violence in recent history (the 
2011 shooting of Arizona State Representative Gabrielle Giffords, or the 2012 mass shooting in 
an Aurora, Colorado movie theater being two other examples), the loss of life, particularly young 
lives, from the Sandy Hook incident resulted in increased public support for measures to address 
gun violence. Some proposals to reduce gun violence arose in federal and state legislatures. 
These proposals have included universal background checks for those seeking to purchase 
firearms, limiting the capacity of ammunition magazines, and assault weapons bans.  
At the time of the Sandy Hook shooting, the state of New York already had an assault weapons 
ban in place. However, the state legislature took this increase in public support for gun control 
measures as an opportunity to amend that statute, creating the New York Secure Ammunition 
and Firearms (SAFE) Act of 2013. The part of this amendment that is my focus in this paper is 
the addition of a “reporting requirement” for mental health professionals: now, mental health 
professionals in New York are required to report the names and demographic information of 
“dangerous” patients to the state government. In response to this legislation, I will explore the 
role of the health care professional in such reporting requirements, including those that already 
operate in several domains of public health protection, as well as in the context of measure such 
as New York’s that seek to reduce gun violence. 
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1.1 STATEMENT OF THESIS AND PROJECT PLAN 
In this paper, I will argue that the New York state statute’s reporting requirement is misguided 
for several reasons. First, prediction of violence is not an exact science. Second, both the 
existence of mandatory reporting requirements, and acting in fulfillment of them, can damage the 
therapeutic relationship. Finally, the implementation of such a reporting requirement provides 
substantial opportunity for compromised patient privacy and discrimination. 
In Section 2.0 of  this paper, I will explain the details of the New York Secure 
Ammunition and Firearms (SAFE) Act of 2013. This overview will elucidate what role mental 
health professionals are now expected to take in helping to prevent gun violence. This legislation 
amended the state’s existing assault weapons ban. Now, when a mental health professional 
determines that a person is likely to engage in conduct that would result in serious harm to self or 
others, she is required to report the person’s name and demographic information to the New 
York Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS). As a result of the mental health 
professional’s report, this information will be used by the DCJS to determine whether that person 
has an existing license to possess firearms. Then, the reported information will be used to 
determine whether the license will be suspended or revoked. If the person does not have a 
license, the reported information will be used to determine whether the individual should be 
considered ineligible to obtain a license in the future. 
In Section 3.0 I will examine reporting requirements imposed to in other contexts. The 
purpose of this section is to explore the role of health care professionals in other measures 
intended to protect public health that involve reporting otherwise confidential information to the 
state. This analysis will serve as a point of comparison for the reporting role of mental health 
professionals in New York as envisioned by the SAFE Act. I will analyze four other situations 
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where reporting requirements have been instituted: when a patient has a communicable disease, 
when a patient is medically unfit to drive, in cases of child abuse, and drug use by pregnant 
women. In each of these cases, I will examine the legal requirements regarding what 
professionals are to report, to whom they must report, and what liberties might be limited 
because of these reports, as well as broader implications of implementing the reporting 
requirement. I will also analyze the rationale for imposing these reporting requirements and why 
they require the information to be reported by health care professionals. 
In Section 4.0, t he final part of this project, I will return to the reporting requirement 
imposed by the New York SAFE Act to examine the practical and ethical implications of the 
reporting requirement it imposes. First, I will argue that this law’s focus on the mentally ill is  
inappropriate. Targeting a population which accounts for only a small portion of overall gun 
violence does not address the major perpetrators or causes of gun violence. Instead, it effectively 
makes scapegoats of the mentally ill. Moreover, those with mental illness continue to face social 
stigma because of their illness; therefore the law’s focus on the mentally ill raises concern about 
the exacerbation of discrimination and stigmatization of those with mental illness and concern 
for the welfare of this already vulnerable population. Singling out a subset of the mentally ill for 
the potential loss of a constitutionally protected right to own a firearm may, for some, carry with 
it an especially weighty stigma. Moreover, in some communities and cultures within the United 
States being unable to own a gun may be a clearly evident mark that is stigmatizing. In any 
culture or community, being unable to own a legal firearm places one in the same class--or at 
least in the same circumstance--as those whose criminal record denies them the right to purchase 
a gun. The designation as unfit to own a gun is thus stigmatizing in the United States no matter 
the norms of one’s particular community, and a reporting requirement that presents the 
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possibility of this designation involves health care professionals in this potentially stigmatizing 
enterprise. 
Next, I will explore how this law requires that mental health professionals predict 
violence. The law therefore relies on the professional judgment of the professionals: however, 
violence prediction is difficult and not always accurate. The difficulty and imprecision of 
predicting violence opens the door for professionals’ prejudicial judgments, and perhaps their 
concern to avoid liability, to result in injustice. Relying on an individual’s best guess can be 
subject to that physician’s personal biases and lead to unfair or arbitrary determinations 
regarding which patients are predicted to be violent. Fears of the consequences resulting from a 
failure to predict a violent action on the part of a mentally ill person may lead professionals to 
employ over-inclusive criteria when predicting violence. Such over-inclusion would unduly 
restrict the liberty of the mentally ill to own a firearm, and unduly subject mentally ill individuals 
to labeling and potential stigma. Thus there are important implications for the liberty and welfare 
interests of those with mental illness that arise when employing this, at best, inexact science. 
Finally, I will examine the effect this law’s reporting requirement may have on t he 
therapeutic relationship. Both the existence of such a reporting requirement and an individual 
professional’s acting in response to it can erode trust between the physician and patient. Patients’ 
fears of losing their right to gun ownership, of having individual privacy compromised, or of 
possible discrimination may lead some mentally ill people to avoid seeking treatment that could 
be beneficial to them. Here too, the welfare of people with mental illness is at stake. 
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2.0  THE NEW YORK SAFE ACT: PROVISIONS AND INITIAL PROBLEMS 
The New York Secure Ammunition and Firearms (SAFE) Act of 2013 was passed on January 
15, 2013.1 This piece of legislation marked the first change in the state’s assault weapons ban in 
more than ten years.2 The existing assault weapons ban was passed in 1994 a nd prohibited 
possession of assault weapons and large capacity ammunition feeding devices.3 The SAFE Act 
amends the assault weapons ban by imposing new reporting requirements on m ental health 
professionals. These reporting requirements took effect on May 15th, 2013. 
§ 9.46 of  the Mental Health Act is the portion of the SAFE Act that implements this 
reporting requirement for mental health professionals. The text of this section reads as follows: 
§ 9.46 Reports of substantial risk or threat of harm by mental health professionals. 
(a) For purposes of this section, the term "mental health professional" shall 
include a physician, psychologist, registered nurse or licensed clinical social 
worker. 
(b) Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, when a mental health 
professional currently providing treatment services to a person determines, in the 
exercise of reasonable professional judgment, that such person is likely to engage 
in conduct that would result in serious harm to self or others, he or she shall be 
required to report, as soon as practicable, to the director of community services, or 
the director's designee, who shall report to the division of criminal justice services 
whenever he or she agrees that the person is likely to engage in such conduct. 
Information transmitted to the division of criminal justice services shall be limited 
to names and other non-clinical identifying information, which may only be used 
1 Bob Clark, “The SAFE Act Facts and Debates,” Olean Times Herald, March 10, 2013, 
accessed March 10, 2013 http://www.oleantimesherald.com/news/article_a1a1d16c-8a65-11e2-
936a-0019bb2963f4.html 
2 Clark, “The SAFE Act.” 
3 NYS Penal Law § 265.02(7)-(8). 
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for determining whether a license issued pursuant to section 400.00 of the penal 
law should be suspended or revoked, or for determining whether a person is 
ineligible for a license issued pursuant to section 400.00 of the penal law, or is no 
longer permitted under state or federal law to possess a firearm. 
(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to require a mental health 
professional to take any action which, in the exercise of reasonable professional 
judgment, would endanger such mental health professional or increase the danger 
to a potential victim or victims. 
(d) The decision of a mental health professional to disclose or not to disclose in 
accordance with this section, when made reasonably and in good faith, shall not 
be the basis for any civil or criminal liability of such mental health professional.4 
2.1 PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT AND THE PREDICTION OF VIOLENCE 
The SAFE Act requires that mental health professionals must use “reasonable professional 
judgment” to determine if a person is likely to “engage in conduct that would result in serious 
harm to self or others.”5 If the mental health professional determines that a person is likely to 
harm himself or others, the professional is required to report that person’s name to “the director 
of community services, or the director's designee, who shall report to the division of criminal 
justice services.”6 
In a legal sense, “reasonable professional judgment” is both a standard of care 
(considered from a national rather than a local perspective).7 To establish this standard of care, or 
to evaluate its assertion as a d efense, a court would consider expert testimony as to what any 
4 New York Code, Title B Mental Health Act, §9.46 
5 New York Code, Title B Mental Health Act, §9.46(B) 
6 Id. 
7 John Parry and Eric York Drogin, Mental Disability Law, Evidence and Testimony: Reference 
Manual for Lawyers, Judges, and Mental Disability Professionals (Chicago, ABA Publishing, 
2007), 370-371. 
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reasonable professional would have done in similar circumstances.8 The professional will only 
be found liable when “the decision by a professional is such a substantial departure from 
accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person 
responsible did not base the decision on such a judgment.”9 
By requiring the use of reasonable professional judgment, the SAFE Act, in essence, 
requires that the mental health professional act in the same manner as any other member of the 
profession would with regard to the prediction of violence. The problem with reasonable 
professional judgment in the prediction of violence is that professionals are only marginally 
better at predicting violence based on their professional clinical judgment than by chance. Lidz, 
Mulvey, and Gardner conducted a study to assess the accuracy of clinician prediction of violence 
in mental patients. Lidz et al. found that violence occurred in 53% of cases where the clinician 
predicted violence, while violence that occurred in 36% of cases in the comparison group where 
no prediction was made.10 The overall clinical accuracy was only slightly better than chance, 
although the prediction of violence in female patients was not better than chance.11 
8 Parry and Drogin, Mental Disability Law, 371. 
9 Id. 
10 Charles Lidz et al., “The Accuracy of Predictions of Violence to Others,” Journal of the 
American Medical Association Vol. 269 No. 8 (February 1993): 1007. 
11 Lidz et al., “The Accuracy of Predictions of Violence,” 1007. 
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2.2 SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF REPORTING REQUIREMENT 
Mental health professionals are defined in the SAFE Act as defined as any physician, 
psychologist, registered nurse, or licensed clinical social worker.12 As defined in the law, the 
term “mental health professional” presents some practical problems. First, the term does not 
include all the types of professionals that may encounter patients who exhibit the same 
symptoms fulfilling the criteria for predicting violence that then obligate other professionals to 
report under the SAFE Act. Licensed clinical social workers are the only type of social worker 
mandated to make these reports, while social workers with different credentials are excluded 
from making them, even though they may deal with the same types of clients and witness similar 
symptoms that are ostensibly predictive of future violence.13 The solution to this practical 
problem of some social workers being required and others prohibited from reporting is to include 
social workers of all credentials to the Act’s definition of mental health professional, thereby 
requiring that all report. 
Additionally, the Act’s reporting requirement applies to professionals who may not 
conceive of themselves as “mental health professionals,” and who may have even less expertise 
in determining whether a patient presents a risk of future violence than trained mental health 
professionals. All physicians are mandated to report, whether they specialize in mental health or 
not. Two primary problems arise. First, the law is relying on the expertise of the professionals to 
predict violence. As unreliable as violence prediction is when those who specialize in mental 
health attempt it, physicians who specialize in other areas may be even less equipped to handle 
the prediction of violence. 
12 New York Code, Title B Mental Health Act, §9.46(a) 
13 New York Code, Title B Mental Health Act, §9.46(a) 
 8 
                                                 
 Second, many physicians may not think of themselves as mental health professionals and 
may not be aware that they need to report the patient themselves rather than simply referring 
their patient to a mental health specialist. Yet, should a patient visit his primary care physician 
presenting as likely to engage in conduct that will cause harm to himself or others, simply 
referring that patient to another mental health professional would not discharge the primary care 
physician’s duty to report the patient’s name and demographic information to the local Director 
of Community Services, who then reports to the Division of Criminal justice Services.  
When mental health professionals determine that, in their professional judgment, a 
patient is likely to do ha rm to self or others, they are required to submit their report via New 
York’s Office of Mental Health website. The report form has text fields, radio buttons, and drop 
down menus that collect information about the professional doing the reporting, the 
professional’s relationship to the person they are reporting, and information about the person 
being reported, including demographics, as well as an open text box to enter the specific reason 
for the report (see Figure 1).14 The information in these reports is sent to the appropriate local 
director of community services in the county where the patient resides, who then reviews the 
reports.15 If the director of community services agrees that the patient is likely to do harm to self 
or others, the director then sends the “non-clinical identifying information” to the New York 
State Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) where it is  used to determine whether that 
individual currently has a license to possess firearms.16 If the reported patient has a gun license, 
14 The form for reporting is located at https://nysafe.omh.ny.gov/ 
15 New York Code, Title B Mental Health Act, §9.47 
16 New York Code, Title B Mental Health Act, §9.46(b) 
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the non-clinical identifying information will be given to the local licensing official.17 Once the 
person’s license is suspended or revoked, the license and any firearms must be surrendered to the 
local official. The time line for this process is not defined in the law, though the guidance 
document posted on the New York Office of Mental Health’s (OMH) website states that 
professionals should report “as soon as is practicable.”18 
The potential vagueness of professionals’ reports is another practical issue occasioned by 
this law. The New York OMH’s guidance document for reports (found on the same site where 
reports are submitted) simply re-states the definition found in §9.01 of  New York’s Mental 
Hygiene Act that a reasonable professional judgment must be used to determine whether, ““(a) a 
substantial risk of physical harm to the person, as manifested by threats of or attempts at suicide 
or serious bodily harm or other conduct demonstrating that the person is dangerous to himself or 
herself, or (b) a substantial risk of physical harm to other persons as manifested by homicidal or 
other violent behavior which places others in reasonable fear of serious physical harm.”19 Dr. 
Kamin, the Chief of Clinical and Forensic Services at the Monroe County Office of Mental 
Health in Rochester New York, recounted one report that said, “Patient told the provider he was 
hoping to obtain a pistol permit.” This report, for example, in no w ay indicated that the 
individual was a danger to himself or others as defined in §9.01, a nd is an instance of over 
inclusive reporting practices. 
 
 
17 Id. 
18 http://www.omh.ny.gov/omhweb/safe_act/guidance.pdf 
19 New York Code, Title B Mental Health Act, §9.01 
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 Figure 1. NY SAFE Act Reporting Page 
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3.0  ANALYSIS OF OTHER REPORTING REQUIREMENTS INTENDED TO 
PROTECT THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH 
The amendment to the New York assault rifle ban is a measure intended to protect the public’s 
health by reducing overall gun violence. In this section, I will examine the rationale behind other 
physician reporting requirements that have been enacted to protect public health. There are 
several frameworks that can be used for the ethical justification of a public health intervention. 
Nancy Kass’ states that a public health intervention ought to “reduce morbidity or mortality; data 
must substantiate that a program…will reduce morbidity or mortality; burdens of the program 
must be identified and minimized; the program must be implemented fairly…and fair procedures 
must be used to determine which burdens are acceptable to a community.”20 R.E.G. Upshur’s 
framework relies on four principles to justify a public health intervention: the prevention of 
harm, the least restrictive or coercive means, reciprocity, and transparency.21 Childress et al. 
outline five justificatory conditions that lawmakers and public health officials ought to take into 
account in order to minimize conflict between measure implemented to protect public health and 
the rights and interests of individuals.22 These five justificatory conditions are effectiveness, 
20 Nancy E. Kass, “An Ethics Framework for Public Health,” American Journal of Public Health 
Vol. 91, No. 11 (November 2001): 1776. 
21 1. R.E.G. Upshur, “Principles for the Justification of a Public Health Intervention,” Canadian 
Journal of Public Health Vol. 93, No. 2 (March-April 2002): 102. 
22 James F. Childress et al., “Public Health Ethics: Mapping the Terrain,” Journal of Law, 
Medicine & Ethics 30 (2002): 172. 
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proportionality, necessity, least infringement, and public justification.23 These different 
frameworks rely on similar concepts: transparency and public justification are similar, as are 
effectiveness and data that substantiates a reduction in morbidity and mortality, or the 
minimizing of burdens and least restrictive means. In this paper, I will rely on the justificatory 
framework outlined by Childress et al. 
If a public health protection measure is going to infringe on an individual’s ethically 
relevant interest, such as autonomy and personal liberty, or privacy and confidentiality, this 
measure should be shown to be both necessary to protect the public health need and effective in 
doing so.24 The benefits of protecting the public health ought to outweigh the potential harm, i.e. 
the benefit must be proportional to the potential harm to the individual or individuals affected.25 
Even if those first three conditions are met, the principle of least infringement should be used in 
order to minimize harm. Childress states, “For instance, when a policy infringes autonomy, 
public health agents should seek the least restrictive alternative; when it infringes privacy, they 
should seek the least intrusive alternative; when it infringes confidentiality, they should disclose 
only the amount and kind of information needed, and only those necessary to realize the goal.”26 
Finally, when a public health measure infringes on individuals’ rights or interests, the measure 
should be able to be justified to the public, including to those people whose rights are the ones 
being infringed upon.27 The other four principles may be employed to proffer such a 
justification; however, this final principle stresses the importance of public accountability for 
measures enacted to protect public health and the value of transparency with regard to the 
23 Childress et al., “Public Health Ethics,” 172. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
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rationale for implementing such public health protections. In the following examples of 
physician reporting requirements some are revealed to meet these justificatory conditions better 
than others. 
3.1 REPORTING REQUIREMENTS RELATED TO COMMUNICABLE DISEASES 
The 10th Amendment of the United States Constitution allows states to enact laws to regulate 
actions pertaining to the health, safety, morals, and general welfare. This “police power” is the 
constitutional basis for state governments’ enactment of laws that can require physicians and 
other professionals to report communicable diseases to public health agencies.28 
The types of diseases that are reportable, and the agencies responsible for receiving the 
report vary by state.29 The person who has the duty to report is also state-specific, but most states 
impose that duty on physicians. In addition to the disease, physicians generally have to report the 
patient’s name and demographic information. Interest in preventing and limiting the spread of 
some kinds of communicable diseases is the rationale behind this type of reporting requirement. 
The limited compromise of some individuals’ privacy involved in reporting those individuals to 
state authorities has benefits for the population as a whole. This collection of data means that 
public health education and prevention efforts can be focused on the geographic areas and people 
that need them most. Required reporting of the names and locations of individuals with 
designated diseases to government agencies helps a state protect the health of the public in two 
28 Lawrence O. Gostin, Public Health Law: Power, Duty, Restraint, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 
CA: University of California Press, 2000), 117. 
29 Gostin, Pubic Health Law, 118. 
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ways. First, having the name and demographic information of infected individuals can ensure 
that those individuals receive the appropriate medical treatment, which may help prevent those 
individuals from spreading the disease. Second, the reporting requirement facilitates the 
collection of data. Amassing accurate data, in turn, and allows public health officials to 
determine the sources of outbreaks and to track the spread of the diseases and to allocate the 
limited resources to the geographic areas or populations most in need.30 
Even though the reporting of certain communicable disease to the government by 
physicians is required by law, and has been established as a proper exercise of the police 
power.31 However, it is  not without ethical concern. Mandating that physicians are required to 
report communicable diseases can place the public health official’s duty to the community as a 
whole in opposition to the physician’s duty to the individual patient. A public health official 
might defend the necessity of the reporting requirement by citing the importance of gathering 
these data in order to appropriately tailor treatment and prevention efforts, as well as a collective 
responsibility to the whole population.32 But a p hysician might see her duty to report as a 
violation of her patient’s confidentiality and a source of mistrust within the therapeutic 
relationship. In addition to the intrinsic problem of violating confidentiality, patients may be less 
likely to seek medical care if they realize that their sensitive information may be reported to the 
government and that this information may be used to track down those that the patient may have 
infected, thereby exposing them to possible negative social consequences.33 However, in spite of 
the mistrust that such a reporting requirement potentially creates within the therapeutic 
30 Id. at 120. 
31 Id. at 50-51. 
32 Id at 119. 
33 Id at 120. 
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relationship, placing the reporting burden on physicians is an effective way for a state to further 
its interest in protecting the health of its inhabitants by gathering the names and demographic 
information of infected individuals for use by public health officials. 
The reporting of HIV is one case that has been a p articular source of ethical concern. 
HIV/AIDS is itself stigmatizing both in itself, and because it is  associated with stigmatizing 
behaviors such as intravenous drug use, and sexual behavior, particularly between two men. 
Because of this, the required reporting of cases of HIV infection attracted particular ethical and 
legal scrutiny.34 Attempts to craft policy that satisfies the state’s interest in protecting public 
health through tracking diseases can be at odds with individual civil liberties, and the civil 
liberties of many of those with HIV are especially vulnerable. Those using illegal substances or 
engaging in illegal or socially stigmatized sexual behaviors are at risk of forfeiting some civil 
liberties or having their ethical rights infringed through discrimination by others. When HIV 
infection serves as a marker of those stigmatizing behaviors, having ones HIV+ status reported 
increases the risk of incurring those negative consequences. Thus, the required reporting of the 
names of people who have been diagnosed with HIV introduces fears of compromised privacy, 
discrimination, and misuse of the information. When collected in computerized databases, this 
information has the potential to be hacked into and leaked, or otherwise abused, either by the 
government that collected it or by other parties. Some of these fears have already been realized: 
for example, one Florida health official gave the names of people infected with HIV to a dating 
service.35 In another case of a state government’s arguably unethical overreaching, the Illinois 
legislature passed a l aw that required the names of people in the state’s AIDS database to be 
34 Ronald Bayer, “Stigma and the ethics of public health: Not can we but should we,” Social 
Science and Medicine Vol. 67 (2008): 464. 
35 Gostin, Pubic Health Law, 120. 
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cross-referenced with the database of health care licenses in order to ensure that no individuals 
with health care licenses were infected with AIDS.36  
This latter measure fails the test of being either effective or necessary to avoid the 
continued licensing of health care professionals who have HIV. The cross-referencing would not 
effectively discover all those professionals who have HIV, as not all those infected may have 
sought testing and treatment; moreover some may not have seroconverted at the time of testing. 
Nor is the cross-referencing necessary to discover infected health care professionals. Finally, and 
most importantly, the discovery of infected health care professionals is not necessary to 
minimize the risk of transmitting HIV to patients, which is the apparent rationale for conducting 
the cross-referencing. Instead, use of “universal precautions” to avoid infection is an alternative 
means of preventing transmission. This is more effective, and since it involves less intrusion into 
individual privacy than cross-referencing, it is also a less restrictive alternative. 
In the case of HIV reporting, there have been attempts to use a less restrictive means to 
prevent unethical compromises of privacy, as happened in Florida, or discrimination, as 
happened in Illinois. The chief attempt was the use of unique identifiers rather than names in the 
surveillance of individuals with HIV. The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) conducted a study 
of the effectiveness of using unique identifiers in the reports, rather than the names of the 
individuals.37 Although this attempt was less restrictive in terms individual privacy, it was found 
that using a unique identifier was not as effective for the purpose of surveillance as using names 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
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because the records in the databases using unique identifiers were found to be incomplete and 
difficult to match.38 
3.2 REQUIREMENTS TO REPORT MEDICAL UNFITNESS TO DRIVE 
Driving is an activity that has the potential to cause harm to other drivers, pedestrians, and others 
on the road. Because of the inherent risk that is taken when a person drives, the state has an 
interest in protecting public health by regulating drivers. Some of these safety precautions 
include age restrictions, licensing requirements, and even the exclusion of some people with 
certain medical conditions from holding a driver’s license. 
There are medical conditions that can make driving difficult or dangerous: cataracts 
glaucoma, and macular degeneration pose a risk to drivers who have them as they can result in 
reduced vision. Other conditions also have the potential to make driving dangerous such as 
stroke, sleep apnea, or taking some medications as these can cause cognitive limitations, or 
arthritis and muscle weakness which can cause motor skills deficits.39 When people who have 
these (and other) conditions attempt to drive, there is a risk of injury or death that is posed to 
both the driver and others on the road. The State of California Department of Motor Vehicles 
(DMV) found that drivers who were known to the DMV as having reportable medical conditions 
38 Id. 
39 Eby and Molnar, 2008 North American License Policies Workshop Proceedings, (Washington 
D.C.: AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety, 2008), 40. 
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have a crash rate significantly higher than the general driving population.40 Drivers with mental 
impairments have a crash rate that is 2.3 t imes higher than the general driving population.41 
Drivers with physical impairments crash rate is 2.2 times greater the general driving 
population.42 These two groups have much higher crash rates than even the “high risk” group of 
males under 25 years of age, who have a crash rate 1.7 t imes that of the general driving 
population, and are typically singled out for this increased risk through increased car insurance 
premiums.43 
Because of the danger, and increased risk of accidents, that these conditions pose to 
drivers, their passengers, and others on the road, many states seek to protect public health and 
safety by preventing those who are medically unfit to drive from obtaining a driver’s license. 
This end is furthered by laws that either require or allow physicians to report to the state any 
patient who has medical conditions that would result in impaired or dangerous driving. Although 
unsafe driving may be detected by family and friends before a physician is consulted, the law 
likely chooses the physician as the required reporter because there is a specific list of conditions 
that the law requires to be reported and the physician is the one with the state-recognized 
credentials to diagnose these conditions. Further, physicians may be considered to have more 
objective measure for assessing fitness to drive than are available to lay people simply observing 
their fellows. Finally, physicians’ judgment may be considered to be less biased by irrelevant 
considerations: neighbors, friends, or family may let interpersonal conflicts, grudges, or personal 
40 State of California Department of Motor Vehicles, Medical Conditions and Other Factors in 
Driver Risk, Report to the Legislature of the State of California in accord with Senate Bill 335, 
Chapter 985, 2000 Legislative Session, (Sacramento, CA: May 2001), 3. 
41 Medical Conditions and Other Factors in Driver Risk, 9. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
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biases either affect their judgment of another’s driving ability, or lead them to falsely or 
maliciously report their fellows. 
Pennsylvania is an example of a state that requires physicians to report when they judge 
one of their patients is medically unfit to drive. Pennsylvania’s statute lists certain conditions, 
such as failure to meet the vision standards or seizure disorders, as triggering the reporting 
requirement.44 If a patient has one of the listed conditions, the physician is required to report the 
name, date of birth, and address in writing to the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation 
(PennDOT) within ten days.45 
But when requiring a physician to report medically unfit drivers to the state, the question 
of whether driving has the legal status of a privilege or a right comes into play. If driving is a 
right, then due process--likely in the form of a hearing--must be exercised when the right is 
going to be restricted, limited, or revoked. One argument in support of considering driving a 
right because the Supreme Court has found interstate travel is a fundamental right.46 However, 
this argument has been rejected by courts. So long as there are other means of interstate travel 
available, the existence of barriers to any specific mode of transportation does not violate the 
right to interstate travel.47 This holds whether that barrier is the requirement of medical fitness to 
drive in order to maintain a driver’s license, or the high cost of a plane ticket.  
44 Pennsylvania Code § 83.6 
45 Pennsylvania Code § 83.6 
46 As noted by the court in Miller v. Reed, no.97-17006 US 9th. Cir. (1999): “The Supreme 
Court has recognized a fundamental right to interstate travel. Attorney General of New York v. 
Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 903, 106 S.Ct. 2317, 90 L.Ed.2d 899 (1986) (Brennan, J., plurality 
opinion).” 
47 As the court in Miller v. Reed states: “See Monarch Travel Servs., Inc. v. Associated Cultural 
Clubs, Inc., 466 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir.1972) (“A rich man can choose to drive a limousine;  a 
poor man may have to walk. The poor man's lack of choice in his mode of travel may be 
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It seems most reasonable to consider driving is not a legal right, but a privilege that is 
granted only to individuals that satisfy certain requirements imposed by the state: being of a 
certain age, being licensed, following the driving laws, and being medically fit to drive. Keeping 
unsafe drivers off the road is a public health concern. The motivation behind state laws that 
require physicians to report patients who are medically unfit to drive is that the need for safety 
outweighs an individual’s need to drive. 
Ethically speaking, whether driving is legally considered a privilege or a right is less 
important than its social role. For many people, restricting their ability to drive legally restricts 
their ability to participate in many common aspects of daily life. Losing the ability to drive can 
restrict a person’s ability to pursue employment, necessary activities such as buying groceries or 
keeping medical appointments, as well as the ability to socialize and otherwise enjoy life. 
Because restricting driving impedes the pursuit of so many activities and thus has negative 
consequences for an individual’s well-being, these consequences must be proportional to the 
health risks continued driving would impose. This balancing of potential harms is critical both in 
determining which conditions should trigger the reporting requirement and in demanding that 
physicians use due care when diagnosing such conditions in individuals. Restricting driving is 
perhaps both necessary and the only effective means of preventing a particular range of risks on 
the road; however, all drivers (as well as pedestrians, bicyclists, and others) incur some risk 
when taking to the road. As evidenced by no-fault insurance schemes that are implemented in 
some states, there is a recognition that risk reduction is an appropriate goal with regard to the 
unfortunate, but it is not unconstitutional.”);  City of Houston v. FAA, 679 F.2d 1184, 1198 (5th 
Cir.1982) (“At most, [the air carrier plaintiffs’] argument reduces to the feeble claim that 
passengers have a constitutional right to the most convenient form of travel. That notion, as any 
experienced traveler can attest, finds no support whatsoever in [the Supreme Court's right of 
interstate travel jurisprudence] or in the airlines' own schedules.”).” 
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regulation of driving and the risks it presents. Reporting requirements put in place to remove 
drivers from the road who are especially risky due to medical conditions should similarly reflect 
a goal of risk reduction, and thus require a balancing of the potential harms prevented and 
imposed by reporting and removing such individuals. 
3.3 REQUIRED REPORTING OF CHILD ABUSE 
Mandatory physician reporting in cases of suspected child abuse is a r elatively recent legal 
requirement. The diagnosis of “battered child syndrome” arose out of work done in the early 
1960s by Kempe, Silverman, Steele, and Drogemeuller.48 The work of Kempe et al. also pointed 
out physician reluctance to question patients around the subject of child abuse. Once battered 
child syndrome had been defined, and the problem of physician reluctance to report child abuse 
came to light, there came a push for model legislation that would require the reporting of 
maltreatment of children.49 Legislation that required reporting of suspected maltreatment was 
specifically intended to induce physicians to report injuries that they might not have otherwise 
acknowledged as possible abuse.50 
The legal requirements for reporting suspected child abuse, much like the requirements 
for reporting individuals with communicable diseases and patients who are medically unfit to 
drive, are different in each state. Most laws require reporting to the individual state’s designated 
48 Kalichman, Seth C. “Mandatory Child Abuse Reporting Laws: Origins and Evolution,” in 
Mandated Reporting of Suspected Child Abuse: Ethics, Law & Policy (2nd Ed.). (Washington 
D.C.: American Psychological Association, 1999), 10. 
49 Kalichman, “Mandatory Child Abuse Reporting Laws,” 10-11. 
50 Id. at 38 
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child protection services when the physician (or other designated party) has “reason to believe” 
or “reasonable cause to suspect” that maltreatment is happening.51 What is considered 
maltreatment also varies by state. Statutes can focus on vague signs/symptoms using broad terms 
such as “mental injury” or “psychological impairment.”52 Other statutes have a narrower focus 
on physical symptoms such as bruises, burns, or fractures or on s pecific acts such as incest, 
molestation, or rape.53 In every state, all professionals who are required to report suspected 
maltreatment are provided protection from civil and criminal liability associated with reporting.54 
Originally, such laws targeted physicians in primary care and emergency medicine, under 
the rationale that those physicians would be the most likely to encounter a child whose injuries 
were incurred through abuse.55 Physicians objected to being singled out by these reporting laws, 
and also cited concerns about protecting patient privacy and confidentiality, and maintaining 
trust in the physician-patient relationship. In 1964 t he American Medical Association (AMA) 
stated, “This is a social problem in which the physician plays but a part…To compel reporting by 
the physician alone may single him out unwisely. Knowing of this requirement, the parent or 
guardian may, for his own protection, put off seeking medical care.”56 Rather than this argument 
reducing or eliminating state laws that require the reporting of suspected abuse, by the 1970s the 
laws were expanded to include other health care professionals, social service workers, teachers, 
and in some states even commercial film developers.57 
51 Id. at 29-30. 
52 Id. at 29. 
53 Id. at 29. 
54 Id. at 24. 
55 Id. at 23. 
56 Id. at 23. 
57 Id. at 23-24. 
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The AMA’s concern that compulsory reporting of suspected abuse to state child 
protective services would cause parents to avoid seeking medical attention for their children is 
understandable: patient confidentiality is highly valued for both intrinsic and instrumental 
reasons. Patient confidentiality is the basis of trust in the physician-patient relationship; without 
that trust, patients will not reveal sensitive information that can be crucial for proper diagnosis 
and care. Moreover, parents’ fear of having their child taken away--whether by mistake or 
because of actual abuse--as well as their fear of being prosecuted and stigmatized as a child 
abuser is a strong incentive for parents to avoid the person who would report suspected abuse to 
the government. However, in this context, the welfare of children and families remains the most 
important consideration in the eyes of the legislatures. Since the implementation of these laws, 
the number of reports of suspected abuse has steadily increased, and even exceeded the abilities 
of states’ resources to intervene.58  
The requirement to report suspected child abuse, at least in theory, seems to fulfill the 
requirement that this public health protection measure--one that appropriately infringes on 
inappropriately wielded parental powers and liberties--is effective in reducing future abuse. 
Further, the requirement seems to balance the potential harms and benefits appropriately, thereby 
satisfying the requirement of proportionality. In practice, to minimize the harms of reporting or 
misreporting abuse, those charged with reporting, and subsequently investigating, must not abuse 
their respective authority. In other words, those reporting suspected abuse must exercise 
professional judgment in determining whether physical injuries or psychological responses truly 
indicate potential abuse. They must not allow their personal biases toward or against any 
particular parents to influence their judgments of what they observe in the child. They must 
58 Id at 38. 
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recognize that the goal of the reporting requirement is to protect children from abuse while 
minimally affecting family structure and relationships, and parental authority. Those 
investigating reports must act with similarly restricted motives and humility, while taking actions 
necessary to determine whether suspected abuse is truly abuse and whether (and what) 
intervention is warranted. 
Legally, before parents are deprived access to their children, a civil or criminal court case 
is initiated by a child welfare caseworker. The Child Welfare Information Gateway on the U.S. 
Department of Human Services website outlines the basic process of taking a case of child abuse 
and neglect to court: before initiating a court proceeding to remove the child, the caseworker 
must consider whether the child is in clear danger of significant harm, and whether there is a way 
that the child’s safety could be maintained by providing help to the family instead of initiating 
court proceedings for removal.59 This final provision seeks to fulfill the “least restrictive 
alternative” requirement. With a co urt proceeding comes due process: parents generally have 
right to notice of the court proceeding, a contested fact-finding hearing.60 Other particularities 
can vary by state or be dependent on w hether the trial is civil or criminal: some states afford 
parents right to a lawyer, and if it is criminal proceeding, parents may have the right to 
confrontation, cross-examination, and a jury trial.61 
In terms of the necessity of the reporting requirement, the state has a strong interest in 
protecting children from abuse so that those children will grow up to be productive members or 
society. That the number of reports has exceeded the states’ capacity to intervene demonstrates 
59 “The Court System and Child Abuse and Neglect,” Child Welfare Information Gateway, 
accessed November 10th, 2013. 
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/usermanuals/courts_92/courtsc.cfm 
60 “The Court System and Child Abuse and Neglect.” 
61 Id. 
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the possible necessity of this measure. The public justification requirement is also fulfilled: the 
state must justify itself to the specific parents in a public court proceeding. 
3.4 REPORTING OF ILLEGAL DRUG USE BY PREGNANT WOMEN 
The state’s interest in protecting fetuses, and the children they will become, from the harms of 
illegal drug use by pregnant women is another area where public health concerns clash with the 
patient’s interests and rights that are undermined by reporting requirements imposed on 
physicians. Abusing drugs while pregnant poses risk to both the pregnant woman and her fetus. 
How to balance the bodily autonomy of the woman and the state’s interest in encouraging 
healthy pregnancies has proved to be difficult for many state legislatures. 
In the absence of criminal laws that specifically refer to drug use during pregnancy, 
prosecutors in some states have taken creative approaches when charging women who abuse 
illegal drugs while pregnant. Some have charged women with possession of a controlled 
substance, delivering drugs to a minor, or child abuse and neglect.62 Women in many states who 
have appealed their convictions under these different laws were successful in all states except 
South Carolina. In the 1997 case, Whitner v. South Carolina, the state supreme court found that a 
viable fetus is recognized as a person under the state’s criminal child endangerment statute, and 
therefore drug abuse while pregnant could constitute child abuse.63 
62 Dailard and Nash. “State Responses to Drug Abuse Among Pregnant Women,” The 
Guttmacher Report on Public Policy (December 2000): 3. 
63 Dailard and Nash. “State Responses to Drug Abuse Among Pregnant Women,” 3. 
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Rather than using the criminal law to attack the problem of drug use during pregnancy, 
other states have taken it as a matter of civil law and have chosen to expand child welfare laws to 
include prenatal drug exposure.64 In seven states, health care professionals are required to report 
to the state when a pregnant woman shows evidence of drug use or if a newborn tests positive for 
drug exposure.65 Since the prenatal exposure to drugs is considered by the states to be a matter of 
child welfare, such reports go to the local child protective services. These reports are then used 
as evidence during child welfare proceedings. 
Ethical concerns arise when requiring physicians to report drug use in pregnant women to 
the state. A primary concern is that women’s knowledge of such a requirement, and then 
physicians acting in fulfillment of the requirement, affects women’s seeking of prenatal care. 
Poland, Dombrowski, Ager, and Sokol, for example, conducted a survey of women’s attitudes 
toward laws that punish pregnant women who use illegal drugs, and found that women would 
“go underground” and eschew treatment for fear of having their drug use detected, in order to 
avoid the subsequent incarceration, or loss of their children.66 Additionally, requiring a breach of 
confidentiality by drug testing and reporting damages women’s trust in their physicians and the 
health care system as a whole by compromising the confidentiality and interpersonal trust that 
grounds the physician-patient relationship. The cost of this loss of trust can create small 
obstacles in effective prenatal care such as women failing to give a complete and accurate 
medical history, or large obstacles such as women avoiding prenatal care altogether.  
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 5. 
66 Marilyn L. Poland et al, “Punishing pregnant drug users: enhancing the flight from care,” Drug 
and Alcohol Dependence Vol. 31, Issue 3 (February 1993): 199. 
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One of the seven states that mandates reporting, Kentucky, has addressed the concern 
about testing without women’s knowledge by requiring the physician to give women notice of 
the testing.67 This aspect of the Kentucky statue attempts to minimize the potential harm to 
pregnant women’s interest by allowing them to “protect” themselves from the intrusion of testing 
and its consequences. It also satisfies to some degree the requirement that the intervention is 
transparent to the public. Nevertheless, it imposes a condition on seeing prenatal care and giving 
birth within a health care system, which may otherwise endanger the welfare of fetus, pregnant 
woman, and newborn. 
Further, the Kentucky law allows physicians the discretion to decide whether or not to 
report to the state.68 Allowing physician discretion in reporting introduces the possibility for 
personal bias, arbitrariness, and risk of unjust application of the reporting requirement. This bias 
can be seen in the fact that poor women and women of color are more often screened for drugs, 
in spite of the fact that illegal drug use occurs at a similar rate in all women, regardless of race or 
class.69 
Finally, the Kentucky law does not allow the drug test results to be used in a criminal 
proceeding.70 This final provision seems most directly designed to tailor the statute to afford the 
benefit of fetal protection while limiting the risks imposed on the individual pregnant woman. In 
this regard, the provision seeks to implement the least restrictive alternative of the fetal 
protection measure. The question remains, however, as to whether even Kentucky’s version of 
67 Dailard and Nash. “State Responses to Drug Abuse Among Pregnant Women,” 5. 
68 Id. 
69 Carolyn S. Carter, “Prenatal Care for Women Who Are Addicted: Implications for Gender-
Sensitive Practice,” Affilia 17:299 (2002): 305, doi 10.1177/0886109902173003. 
70 Dailard and Nash. “State Responses to Drug Abuse Among Pregnant Women,” 5. 
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this type of legislation is effective in preventing drug use in pregnant women, since fear of the 
negative consequences causes women who use drugs to avoid treatment.71 
Requiring physicians to report the drug use of pregnant women to the state under the 
guise of promoting child welfare highlights tension between the bodily autonomy of women and 
the state’s interest in encouraging healthy pregnancies and births. In extreme cases such as South 
Carolina’s Whitner decision, any behavior that could be seen to “endanger” the fetus makes the 
woman subject to criminal liability and potentially undermines the woman’s right to choose an 
abortion.72 The singling out of some behaviors--e.g. illicit substance use--while ignoring the 
potential risks to fetuses presented by other behaviors--e.g. vigorous exercise or use of herbal 
products--is viewed by some commentators as reflecting racist and classist biases in the 
implementation of the South Carolina legislation and in the context of other laws that focus on 
illicit drug use while ignoring other potentially harmful behaviors.73 Finally, that the reporting 
requirement was often applied to economically disadvantaged women or women of color seeking 
prenatal care in public clinics or through the emergency department, rather than to middle and 
upper class women who went to private physicians, leads some commenters to identify race and 
class bias on the part of the medical profession in implementing the requirements. 
The state has an interest in protecting fetuses and children, but the required reporting of 
pregnant women who use illegal drugs does not meet the threshold of being an effective, 
proportional, and necessary infringement on a  woman’s autonomy and personal liberty in the 
name of public health. If the goal is to prevent pregnant women from endangering their fetuses 
through drug use, reporting to the state in order to remove the child from the woman’s custody 
71 Poland et al., “Punishing pregnant drug users,” 199. 
72 Dailard and Nash. “State Responses to Drug Abuse Among Pregnant Women,” 6. 
73 Carter, “Prenatal Care for Women Who are Addicted,” 306. 
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creates incentive for the drug-addicted woman to avoid prenatal care. This is both ineffective and 
dangerous for both the woman and the fetus. Testing and reporting is not the only possible 
intervention: instead of prosecuting the woman, or removing the child once it is born, the state 
could satisfy its interest in promoting healthy pregnancy by expanding access to drug treatment 
programs for pregnant women. 
 30 
4.0  RRACTICAL AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE REPORTING 
REQUIREMENT FOUND IN THE SAFE ACT 
The required reporting for health care professionals in the contexts previously reviewed 
constitutes measures designed to protect public health and safety (in the case of physicians 
reporting communicable diseases and medical unfitness to drive). In the cases of various 
professionals’ required reporting of suspected child abuse and physicians’ reporting of substance 
using pregnant women, the measure are designed to protect the welfare of especially vulnerable 
members of society: children and potential children (fetuses). In contrast, the reporting 
requirement component of the New York SAFE Act ostensibly seeks to protect public health by 
focusing on a nd regulating the behavior of a vulnerable population: the mentally ill. In this 
section, employing the five criteria used to assess other reporting requirements, as well as other 
considerations, I will analyze whether this focus on the mentally ill is  an ethically appropriate 
measure that furthers the law’s intended effect of reducing overall gun violence. 
4.1 PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS AS A VULNERABLE POPULATION 
Despite substantial progress in recognizing mental illness as a medical condition, rather than a 
moral failing, and despite ever increasing understanding of the biological components of mental 
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health conditions and their symptoms, individuals with mental illness still face stereotyping, 
prejudice, and discrimination that are associated with their stigmatizing condition. 
Stigma against mental illness is part of the reason that the mentally ill are a vulnerable 
population. Vulnerability is at its heart “susceptibility to harm.”74 This susceptibility to harm can 
come from many different sources, for example race, poverty, physical weakness, or mental 
illness. These conditions affect how an individual is treated by society and may affect how 
individuals are able to respond to (or defend against) maltreatment. Three crucial components 
contributing to vulnerability are individual capacities (e.g. physical strength or weakness), lack 
or availability of support (e.g. situations of discrimination or protection), and community 
resources (e.g. protection by authorities or resources to engage in self-protection).75 
Vulnerability of various types, or due to different causes, can be exacerbated by stigma and 
discrimination associated with those causes (e.g. the stigma associated with physical defect or 
mental illness).76 With the decreased access to housing and jobs and scarce community resources 
for treatment and support of people with mental illness, as well as the illness itself and self-
stigma potentially hindering an individual’s capacity to handle these difficulties and interact with 
society, mental illness is certainly a source of vulnerability and people with mental illness are a 
vulnerable population. 
The stigma of mental illness manifests in two ways: public stigma, the effect of negative 
attitudes about mental illness and treatment held by the public, and self-stigma, the internalized 
effect of these attitudes resulting in the same negative attitudes held by the person with the 
74 David Mechanic and Jennifer Tanner, “Vulnerable People, Groups, and Populations,” Health 
Affairs 26, No. 5 (2007), 1220. 
75 Mechanic and Tanner, “Vulnerable People,” 1222. 
76 Id. at 1224. 
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stigmatized condition.77 Public stigma and self-stigma may interact, with the public stigma 
serving to amplify self-stigma.78 Both types of stigma can have negative effects on individuals 
who have mental illness. 
Stigmatizing representations of people with mental illness occur in the media. Some of 
these include the representation of people with mental illness as homicidal maniacs, the 
presentation of those with mental illness as having childlike perceptions of the world, or that 
their depiction as rebellious free spirits.79 Stigmatizing attitudes the general public holds about 
mental illness include that it is similar to drug addiction, prostitution, and criminality; that mental 
illness is something the individual has control over and is responsible for; and that help or 
treatment is not deserved.80 Stigmatizing views of mental illness are pervasive, and can even 
occur in mental health professionals.81 
There are four major stereotypes that have negative consequences for individuals with 
mental illness: “(1) People with mental illness are dangerous and should be avoided. (2) People 
with mental illness are to blame for their disabilities that arise from weak character. (3) They are 
incompetent and require authority figures to make decisions for them. (4) They are viewed as 
childlike and profit from parental figures to care for them.”82 These four stereotypes depict the 
mentally ill as either dangerous or incompetent. 
77 Jonathan W. Kanter et al., “Depression Self-Stigma: A New Measure and Preliminary 
Findings,” The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease Vol. 196, No 9 (September 2008): 663. 
78 Id. 
79 Patrick W. Corrigan and David L. Penn, “Lessons from Social Psychology on Discrediting 
Stigma,” American Psychologist Vol. 54, No. 9 (September 1999): 766. 
80 Corrigan and Penn, “Lessons from Social Psychology,” 766. 
81 Id. at 765. 
82 Watson and Corrigan, “The Impact of Stigma on Service Access and Participation: A 
Guideline Developed for the Behavioral Health Recovery Management Project,” 5. Accessed 
June 19th, 2013. http://www.bhrm.org/guidelines/stigma.pdf 
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Stigma causes harm to people with mental illness. Being labeled a “mental patient” can 
result in prejudice and discrimination.83 Attempting to avoid this label can result in the 
individual with mental illness choosing not adhere to treatment regimens, particularly because 
some treatments have discernable side effects, or not to pursue treatment at all.84 Because of 
these labels and stigma, people with mental illness have a more difficult time finding housing 
and employment.85 This discrimination combined with self-stigma (the result of internalizing the 
negative attitudes about mental illness prevalent in society) can cause shame, low self-esteem, 
and demoralization.86 
The physician reporting requirement of the SAFE Act is a policy that reinforces the 
stereotype of mentally ill people as dangerous and the stereotype of them as incompetent and in 
need of parent-like authority figures to make their decisions for them. Requiring mental health 
professionals to report their patients’ words and actions to the state and allowing the state, based 
on a s ingle report, to decide whether the individual should be permitted a gun license, places 
both the physician and the state into a parental role of overseeing people with mental illness. The 
reporting requirement and subsequent state intervention with regard to gun ownership assumes 
that individuals with mental illness are not competent, in effect making a determination of 
competence based largely on the nature of a single interaction where the mental health 
professional determines a likelihood of imminent harm. It restricts or removes decision-making 
ability from the person with mental illness without a particular determination of the person’s 
83 Patrick W. Corrigan, “How Clinical Diagnosis Might Exacerbate the Stigma of Mental 
Illness,” Social Work Vol. 52, No. 1 (January 2007): 31. 
84 Corrigan, “How Clinical Diagnosis Might Exacerbate the Stigma of Mental Illness,” 31. 
85 Corrigan, “How Clinical Diagnosis Might Exacerbate the Stigma of Mental Illness,” 32. 
86 Id. 
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capacity to make a competent decision about purchasing, owning, storing, and discharging a 
firearm. 
Buchanan and Brock argue that competence should be decision-relative--that is that 
competence should be considered to be the capacity to undertake a s pecific task rather than a 
global determination.87 Determining competence then should be determining “a particular 
person’s capacity to perform a particular decision-making task at a particular time under 
specified conditions.”88 In the case of mental illness and gun ownership, perhaps this 
determination should be made at the time when a mental health professional determines a patient 
likely to harm himself or others; at that time the patient may not be competent to make a decision 
about owning and using a firearm. But mental illness is not a static condition; symptoms and 
episodes can be intermittent and an individual with mental illness can demonstrate the capacities 
of communication, understanding, reasoning, and possessing a set of values that are the 
constitutive components of competence89 to make decisions about owning and using a gun. 
The notion of people with mental illness being dangerous and violent is a stereotype that 
is perpetuated by the media.90 The reporting component added to the SAFE Act similarly 
perpetuates the stereotype that people who have a mental illness are dangerous and violent 
because of that mental illness. The primary goal of New York’s assault weapons ban is to reduce 
gun violence. Including a physician reporting requirement in legislation intended to prevent gun 
violence insinuates that the people that physicians must report are major contributors to overall 
87 Allen Buchanan and Dan W. Brock, “Deciding for Others,” The Millbank Quarterly Vol. 64, 
Supplement 2 (1986): 22-23. 
88 Buchanan and Brock, “Deciding for Others,” 23. 
89 Buchanan and Brock, “Deciding for Others,” 25-26. 
90 Bernice A. Pescosolido, et al., “The Public’s View of the Competence, Dangerousness, and 
Need for Legal Coercion of Persons with Mental Health Problems,” American Journal of Public 
Health Vol. 89, No 9 (September 1999): 1341. 
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gun violence. If those to be reported are not major contributors to the problem, then reporting 
them is not an effective measure in reducing the problem. 
4.2 PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS AS PERPETRATORS AND VICTIMS OF 
VIOLENCE 
In order to determine whether targeting gun ownership among the mentally ill is a r easonable 
measure to substantially reduce gun violence--indeed one that warrants singling out a vulnerable 
population for treatment that may exacerbate its vulnerability--one criterion that must be satisfied 
is that of being an effective measure. To determine the measure’s potential effectiveness, in turn, 
it is important to determine whether people with mental illness are perpetrating a substantial 
portion of gun violence, so that taking a measure to prevent their doing so would substantially 
reduce such violence. In 2008, C hoe et al. reviewed empirical studies of both perpetration of 
violence committed by people with mental illness, and their victimization by violence in the 
United States since 1990. This study encompasses violence of all kinds, not only gun violence. 
However, since gun violence is a subset of all violence, these numbers are still important. Choe 
et al. estimated that approximately 6% of adults in the United States have a severe mental 
illness.91 Analyzing studies that used the Epidemiologic Catchment Area data, Choe et al. 
determined that of all people with severe mental illness, 7-8% had perpetrated violence, while 
91 Jeanne Choe et al., “Perpetration of Violence, Violent Victimization, and Severe Mental 
Illness: Balancing Public Health Concerns,” Psychiatric Services Vol. 58, No. 2 ( February 
2008): 153, doi: 10.1176/appi.ps.59.2.153. 
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only 2% of people without any diagnosed mental disorder had perpetrated violence.92 Individuals 
with a severe mental illness are slightly more likely to perpetrate violence than those without any 
diagnosis of mental illness, however individuals with a severe mental illness constitute only 6% 
of the overall population; therefore in absolute numerical terms, it seems that those with mental 
illness may not be responsible for a substantial portion of acts of violence. 
In epidemiologic terms, the percentage of attributable risk is the proportion of incidences 
of a disease in an exposed population that is due to the exposure. The attributable risk of mental 
illness to the perpetration of violence is 2%.93 This means that out of all people who have a 
mental illness (the exposed population), the number who commit violence that is attributable to 
their mental illness, and not other risk factors, is 2%. To put that attributable risk percentage into 
perspective, age and gender are much stronger predictors of violence: males who are 24 years old 
and younger account for approximately 40% of arrests for serious violent crimes, including 
murder, non-negligent homicide, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.94 In spite of this 
much stronger association of sex and age with the perpetuation of violence, there are not 
mandatory reporting requirements being written with young men in mind. 
Given that those with mental illness are associated with such a small proportion of 
violence, including gun violence, singling them out to limit their access to firearms seems an 
ineffective measure to substantially reduce gun violence. Given the social costs--for example, in 
terms of potential effect on the therapeutic relationship (discussed below) and on stigmatization 
of the mentally ill (discussed above)--the measure seems to lack both effectiveness and 
92 Choe et al., “Perpetration of Violence, Violent Victimization, and Severe Mental Illness,” 161. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
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proportionality. Furthermore, given the goal of reducing gun violence and the relatively small 
role that people with mental illness play in perpetrating it, the measure seems unnecessary. 
Rather than posing a significant threat of causing violence, individuals with severe 
mental illness are far more likely to be the victims of violence. The 2005 study by Teplin et al. 
using data from the National Crime Victimization Survey found that of all people with a mental 
illness, 25% had been the victims of violence, while only 3% of the general population were 
victims of violence.95 This disparity shows the magnitude of the mischaracterization of people 
with mental illness as more likely to commit violence, when in reality they are far more likely to 
be the victims of violence. Those with mental illness are thus vulnerable in two senses: they are 
vulnerable to being stigmatized and are disproportionately vulnerable to being victims of 
violence. When laws such as the New York SAFE Act target the mentally ill, rather than 
effectively reducing gun violence, the law instead serves to perpetuate negative stereotypes and 
misunderstanding of mental illness and the risks the ill present to others. 
4.3 PREDICTION OF VIOLENCE 
The accurate and fair implementation, and the potential effectiveness, of the reporting 
requirement of the New York SAFE Act relies on the ability of mental health professionals to 
predict violence in their patients, however prediction of violence is not possible in most cases, 
particularly cases where the individual who commits the violence does not seek help from a 
mental health professional. This difficulty in reliably predicting violence coupled with the legal 
95 Linda A. Teplin et al., “Crime Victimization in Adults with Severe Mental Illness,” Archives 
of General Psychiatry Vol. 62, No. 8 (August 2005): 920, doi 10.1001/archpsyc.62.8.911 
 38 
                                                 
demand to do so creates potential for clinicians to be over-inclusive in identifying their patients 
as “likely to engage in conduct that would result in serious harm to self or others.”96 The 
incentives created by the reporting requirement would seem to lead clinicians to err on the side 
of identifying someone as dangerous. 
Concerns about being held liable for failure to identify a patient who goes on t o 
perpetrate violence would create an incentive for clinicians to use over-inclusive criteria or to be 
expansive in their professional judgment of patients’ dangerousness. The SAFE Act does attempt 
to ameliorate this concern with a provision that states, “The decision of a m ental health 
professional to disclose or not to disclose in accordance with this section, when made reasonably 
and in good faith, shall not be the basis for any civil or criminal liability of such mental health 
professional.”97 However, in spite of not being held legally liable, a wish to avoid guilt or 
feelings of responsibility that could arise from failing to predict a specific instance of violence 
could also lead a clinician to prefer erring on the side of over-inclusiveness.  
The Lidz et al. study assessing the accuracy of clinicians’ prediction of violence in 
mental patients found that violence occurred in 53% of cases where the clinician predicted 
violence, compared to the 36% of cases in the comparison group in which no pr ediction of 
violence had been made.98 The overall accuracy in violence prediction was better than chance, 
although the prediction of violence in female patients was not better than chance.99 Because the 
exercise of professional clinical judgment does not ensure the accuracy of a prediction of 
96 New York Code, Title B Mental Health Act, §9.46(b) 
97 New York Code Title B Mental Health Act, §9.46(d)  
98 Charles Lidz et al., “The Accuracy of Predictions of Violence to Others,” Journal of the 
American Medical Association Vol. 269 No. 8 (February 1993): 1007. 
99 Lidz et al., “The Accuracy of Predictions of Violence,” 1007. 
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violence,100 over-inclusive reports on the part of the mental health professionals in New York 
would be an understandable attempt to ensure that those few patients who will actually go on to 
commit gun violence are prohibited from having a gun license in spite of the social costs of such 
“false positive” judgments for the majority of reported patients who will not go on to commit 
violence. 
The murder of strangers by individuals with mental illness is a statistically rare and 
unpredictable event.101 The mass killings of strangers, such as those in the Sandy Hook school 
shooting, are behind the public support for gun control measures such as the SAFE Act. 
Nevertheless, it is this event’s unpredictability of this type of event that presents a critical 
problem for the implementation of the SAFE Act’s reporting requirement. Nielssen et al. found 
that in the majority of stranger homicides the perpetrator of violence had never been treated with 
medication or admitted to the hospital, and was not known to their local mental health 
services.102 If a person is not known to the professionals providing mental health services, those 
professionals have no opportunity to even attempt to assess the likelihood of committing 
violence.  
The SAFE Act’s reliance on the idea that people with mental illness are inherently violent 
and that mental health professionals have the ability to accurately predict violence is part of the 
legacy of the 1968 G un Control Act.103 That legislation prohibited any person who had been 
100 Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., “Preventing Gun Violence Involving People With Serious Mental 
Illness,” in Reducing Gun Violence in America: Informing Policy with Evidence and Analysis, 
ed. Daniel W. Webster and Jon S. Vernick. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2013), 35. 
101 Olav Nielssen et al., “Homicide of Strangers by People with a Psychotic Illness,” 
Schizophrenia Bulletin Vol. 37, Issue 3 (May 2011): 577, doi:10.1086/599247. 
102 Nielssen et al., “Homicide of Strangers by People with a Psychotic Illness,” 577. 
103 Swanson, “Preventing Gun Violence Involving People with Serious Mental Illness,” 35. 
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involuntarily committed or “been adjudicated as a mental defective” from purchasing 
firearms.104 Although there has been reform of the civil commitment process and 
deinstitutionalization of people with mental illness since that legislation passed in 1968, the law 
has continued to exclude people with mental illness from purchasing guns. This continued 
exclusion is evident in the background check instituted by the 1994 Brady Violence Prevention 
Act.105 The law has been relying on the idea that people who are involuntarily committed to 
psychiatric institutions are at an increased risk for committing violence once released. 
The historical connection of involuntary commitment to the exclusion of mentally ill 
people from obtaining a gun license is overbroad and does not target the correct population. 
Before civil commitment reform began in 1969, i nvoluntarily committing a person effectively 
rested with the discretion of the judge.106 This requisite exercise of discretion meant that there 
may have been people involuntarily committed, and thus excluded from gun ownership, without 
them presenting any risk of committing violence. The present criteria that one must present a 
danger to self or others in order to be involuntarily committed were introduced as a response to 
this judicial discretion. The criteria are meant to safeguard individual liberty, balance such 
liberty against the state interest in protecting its citizens, and limit the number of people admitted 
into state institutions.107 However, the present dangerousness criteria effectively leave the liberty 
of the mentally ill individual in the hands of the mental heath professional who is conducting the 
104 Swanson, “Preventing Gun Violence Involving People with Serious Mental Illness,” 35. 
105 Id. 
106 William H. Fisher and Thomas Grisso, “Commentary: Civil Commitment Statutes--40 Years 
of Circumvention,” The Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law Vol. 38, 
No.3 (2010): 365. 
107 Id. 
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risk assessment, but the professional’s exercise of professional judgment in applying these 
criteria can be affected by social, political, and economic factors.108 
Measures to ensure community treatment, as well as earlier and continued treatment of 
psychosis may help to prevent homicides overall,109 but treatment is not prediction. Many people 
who would benefit from treatment make the decision not to participate in treatment, or do not  
completely adhere to prescribed treatments.110 Some individuals with mental illness may choose 
not to seek treatment because of the stigma associated with having a mental illness. If 
participating in mental health treatment labels a person as a “m entally ill” or as a “m ental 
patient” and if especially in the current social and legal climate these labels in turn lead to that 
person with being considered potentially dangerous, the degree of stigmatization only increases. 
It is reasonable for individuals to consider this social stigma and the discrimination that can 
follow when deciding whether or not to pursue diagnosis and treatment.111 
Reducing the stigma associated with mental illness could lead to an increase in people 
who have mental illness choosing to seek treatment. Requiring physicians to report their patients’ 
thoughts and actions to the state government enshrines in law the incorrect association of 
violence with mental illness. This legislation could have the opposite effect from that intended 
because the implementation of a reporting requirement creates more incentive for individuals 
with mental illness not to seek treatment. The majority of people with mental illness are not 
likely to commit violence, however in the majority of those rare and unpredictable cases of 
108 Id. at 365. 
109 Nielssen et al., “Homicide of Strangers by People with a Psychotic Illness,” 578. 
110 Patrick Corrigan, “How Stigma Interferes with Mental Health Care,” American Psychologist 
Vol. 59 No. 7 (October 2004): 614. 
111 Watson and Corrigan, “The Impact of Stigma on Service Access and Participation,” 2. 
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stranger homicides committed by people with mental illness, those perpetrators had not been 
seeking treatment. 
4.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 
The Second Amendment states that a “well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a 
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.” Being explicitly 
stated in the constitution, gun ownership is a right and not a privilege. However, simply because 
it is a right does not mean it can never be regulated or limited. Keeping guns out of the hands of 
the mentally ill is a limitation of the right to bear arms that is supported by the Supreme Court. In 
the case District of Columbia v. Heller, the Court found that a specific handgun ban was too 
limiting on the right to bear arms, but they stated, “nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast 
doubt on l ongstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons or the mentally 
ill…”112 In the eyes of the Court, laws that prohibit people with mental illness from obtaining a 
gun are presumptively lawful, and so New York’s physician reporting requirement in the SAFE 
Act is not in violation of the Second Amendment. 
Although the SAFE Act is free from legal scrutiny in that sense, whether creating a 
physician reporting requirement that is the basis for taking away such a right is an ethically 
appropriate measure is another matter. The SAFE Act requires a mental health professional to 
report to the state when a patient is likely to harm himself or others. This report is then reviewed 
112 Lawrence E. Rosenthal and Adam Winkler, “The Scope of Regulatory Authority Under the 
Second Amendment,” in Reducing Gun Violence in America: Informing Policy with Evidence 
and Analysis, ed. Daniel W. Webster and Jon S. Vernick. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2013), 226. 
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by the state to determine whether the individual ought to be prohibited from having a gun 
license. Aside from other issues such as the potential to create distrust in the doctor-patient 
relationship, and the inappropriate focus on the mentally ill, allowing a single interaction with a 
mental health professional to be the empirical basis for the removal of a constitutionally 
protected right is a harsh policy. 
Before a felon is prohibited from exercising his right to bear arms, there is a trial, an 
advocate for the accused, and the opportunity for an appeal process that occurs before his status 
as a felon is cemented. Individuals with mental illness get no such process under the SAFE Act. 
Instead, their very personal interaction with the mental health professional meant to be helping 
them is subsequently used by the state to take away their right of gun ownership without the 
additional protections afforded those accused of crimes. From the patient’s perspective, this 
medico-legal response to his seeking medical care could seem an especially onerous attack on his 
right in a vulnerable moment. From the perspective of mental health professionals, the difficulty 
in predicting violence can put them in the situation of preferring to be more inclusive, to sacrifice 
specificity in their judgments out of fear of being inadequately sensitive to the state-imposed 
goal of detecting risk of violence. Mental health professionals are, in effect, forced to play a key 
role in a process that may deny someone a constitutionally protected right. 
4.5 COMPARISON OF THE SAFE ACT’S REPORTING REQUIREMENT TO 
OTHER CONTEXTS 
The SAFE Act’s reporting requirement at first seems quite similar to the reporting requirement in 
the case of child abuse: parents are afforded the right to raise their children how they see fit, until 
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they abuse the child. In the case of child abuse, the physician’s report is reviewed by a s tate 
entity that then decides whether the right to raise their children ought to be taken away from the 
parents. However, one key difference is that laws around child abuse take away a right in order 
to protect a vulnerable population while the SAFE Act is taking away the right of a vulnerable 
population in the name of public safety in spite of evidence to the contrary showing that there is 
little public safety risk. An additional difference is that parents are to be deprived of their child 
only after actually acting in an unethical and illegal manner. In contrast, the SAFE Act’s 
reporting requirement may result in a mentally ill person being deprived of her gun ownership 
right without ever having acted in an inappropriate manner. It is the mere risk of such action that 
grounds the deprivation. 
When a public health intervention is in conflict with a moral consideration, the first 
condition enumerated by Childress et al. is whether that intervention is going to be effective in 
protecting public health.113 In the case of reporting requirements for communicable diseases, the 
reported information is effectively used in disease tracking and tailoring of prevention efforts to 
the correct populations in the service of the goal of preventing the spread of communicable 
diseases. The necessity of gathering the reported information to the effectiveness of the 
intervention was demonstrated when the use of unique identifiers rather than names was 
unsuccessfully attempted.114 In the case of medical unfitness to drive, the reporting requirement 
is effective in preventing drivers whose medical conditions pose a risk of car accident that is 
approximately two times greater than the risk of crash in the general driving population from 
113 Childress et al., “Public Health Ethics,” 172. 
114 Gostin, Pubic Health Law, 120. 
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maintaining a driver’s license.115 For cases of suspected child abuse, reporting is effective in 
removing children from harmful situations, though false reports (“false positives”) result in over-
inclusive removal of children from their parents and many cases of child abuse remain 
undetected and unreported. Nevertheless, the extreme vulnerability of children to abuse, and the 
requirement that some empirical evidence of actual abuse (not mere risk of future abuse) as the 
basis for reports, may warrant the implementation of reporting requirements for cases of 
suspected child abuse. But the reporting requirement in the case of pregnant women who take 
illegal drugs is not an effective measure to prevent the harm that can occur to both the woman 
and her fetus from using illegal drugs. Instead, it creates the incentive for pregnant women who 
use illegal drugs to avoid prenatal care altogether116, which does nothing to remove the danger. 
For the SAFE Act, the effectiveness is questionable. As in the case of pregnant women 
and illegal drug use, the existence of the reporting requirement for mental health professionals 
creates the incentive for individuals to avoid treatment in order to avoid being reported and be 
able to keep or obtain gun licenses. Additionally, the reporting requirement cannot be effective in 
reducing overall gun violence when people with mental illness who commit violence make up 
only a tiny proportion of overall violence. 
The next step is to consider necessity, or whether the goal of the public health 
intervention can only be achieved though this particular measure.117 The reporting requirement is 
necessary for the effective tracking of communicable diseases, for removing licenses from 
medically unfit drivers, and for protecting children from abuse. The reason for this necessity is 
that only medical professionals (or in the case of child abuse, other professionals named in 
115 Medical Conditions and Other Factors in Driver Risk, 9. 
116 Marilyn L. Poland et al, “Punishing pregnant drug users,” 199. 
117 Childress et al., “Public Health Ethics,” 172. 
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statutes who have similar contact with children) have reliable access to evidence of the need for a 
public health intervention. In the case of drug use by pregnant women, taking the less coercive, 
or les restrictive, step of offering a drug treatment program may invalidate the necessity of 
reporting her to the state to face a criminal or civil child removal proceeding. For the reporting 
requirement in the SAFE Act, if the measure were actually an effective way of substantially 
reducing gun violence, the reporting requirement could be similarly necessary (though perhaps 
not the least infringing) as the effective tracking of communicable diseases or removing driver’s 
licenses from the medically unfit, though perhaps would still not be the least infringing 
alternative. 
The next consideration is, therefore, whether this is the policy presents that the most 
minimal infringement on the relevant ethical interests.118 In the case of communicable diseases, 
the least restrictive alternative is one that uses only the amount of sensitive information that is 
absolutely necessary to identify infected cases in order to achieve the goal of reducing the spread 
of communicable disease while still protecting privacy as maximally as possible, given the 
countervailing interest. For medically unfit drivers, removal of the driver’s license infringes on 
liberty, but, depending on t he specific condition, there may be no t reatment or less restricting 
compromise that would make driving with their condition any less dangerous to others on the 
road. In the case of reporting suspected child abuse, due process proceedings should prevent 
actual removal of children from their parents until the abuse is proved in court. 
In the case of the reporting requirement in the SAFE Act, there is no similar due process 
protection as there is in the case of child abuse. Once the determination is made by the state that 
an individual is no longer allowed a gun license, that decision will stand for five years, provided 
118 Childress et al., “Public Health Ethics,” 172. 
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that there are no subsequent reports to start the five year time period over again. Unlike some of 
the conditions cited in cases of medical unfitness to drive which take away the physical ability to 
safely operate a car, mental illness does not permanently render and individual unable to make a 
reasonable decision about safely owning a gun. Less restrictive alternatives that would achieve 
the goal of reducing gun violence without restricting the liberty of people with mental illness 
could include different gun control measures that would target all gun owners (and not just a 
stigmatized group), such as the use of mandatory gun safes, or restrictions on how many rounds a 
single clip could hold. 
The next necessary condition is proportionality. For an intervention to be proportional, 
the public health benefits must outweigh the moral considerations, including the individual 
interests and rights that are infringed.119 Effectively preventing the spread of communicable 
disease outweighs the harm of having personal information disclosed to public health officials, 
so long as that information is not used in a discriminatory manner and the information is kept as 
private as possible. Keeping medically unfit drivers from posing excessive danger to others on 
the road outweighs the harm of restricting those individuals’ personal liberty, particularly if 
possession of a drivers’ license is considered a privilege, not a right. (To minimize the harm to 
individuals caused by restricting their driving privilege, alternate means of transportation should 
be available to enable them to continue to function within society.) The state’s interest in 
protecting children from harm outweighs the right of parental autonomy when that autonomy is 
exercised to harm their children. The state’s interest in protecting potential children is more 
complicated. Although a woman’s liberty does not extend to the right to use illegal drugs, saying 
that the state’s interest in protecting fetuses is a more weighty consideration than a woman’s 
119 Childress et al., “Public Health Ethics,” 172. 
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liberty and right to control her body in this case could lead to negative consequences for a 
woman’s right to choose abortion. The reporting requirement can be a proportional response in 
the interest of protecting the health of the fetus, but only if such reporting was actually an 
effective way to reduce substance abuse by pregnant women. Given that this effectiveness is t 
best doubtful, and given that the reporting requirement may lead women to avoid prenatal care 
and thus risk their own and their fetuses’ health in other ways, the reporting requirement cannot 
meet the criterion of being proportional.  
As for the reporting requirement in the SAFE Act, the primary moral considerations 
being infringed include the liberty of individuals who have mental illness to have a gun license, 
as well as the privacy of those with mental illness (and attendant risks of discrimination and 
stigma) and the trustworthiness of their therapeutic relationship. Does the probable benefit of 
reducing overall gun violence outweigh the infringement of liberty and the compromise of trust? 
If people with mental illness were responsible for the majority of gun violence, the answer might 
be yes. But since they are not, and the positive effect of substantial reduction in gun violence will 
not actually be achieved by this measure, the negative affects of further stigmatizing an already 
vulnerable population outweigh that hypothetical good. 
Finally, there is the responsibility to justify these measures that infringe on moral 
considerations to the public. The privacy infringement caused by the reporting requirement in the 
case of communicable diseases can be justified to the public by demonstrating the effectiveness 
of diseases prevention measures that come from the collected data. The liberty infringement of 
reporting of medically unfit drivers can similarly justified to the public by showing that, in spite 
of the inherent risks involved in driving, the road is safer for everyone when especially unsafe 
drivers are prevented from driving. Reporting of suspected child abuse is also justifiable in spite 
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of the privacy and liberty infringements because of the importance of protecting a vulnerable 
population from harm. But in the case of the SAFE Act’s reporting requirement, the justifications 
of taking liberty away from an already stigmatized group are on s haky ground: targeting 
individuals with mental illness is based on the incorrect assumptions and faulty logic--namely, 
that mental illness makes a person violent and therefore people with mental illness must be 
responsible for the majority of violence. Unfortunately, this view is likely shared by a large part 
of the any given legislator’s constituents, and so they might agree with such justification. But 
this action is not justifiable to the people being targeted with this measure. 
 
Table 1. The Different Reporting Requirements and the Five Justificatory Conditions 
 Effective in 
Protecting 
Public Health 
Necessary for 
Achieving the 
Goal 
Least Infringement 
of Moral 
Consideration 
Proportional 
Harms and Benefits 
Justifiable to 
Both the Public 
and Individuals  
 
Reporting 
Individuals with 
Communicable 
Diseases 
Yes. 
Allows prevention 
efforts to be 
appropriately 
tailored. 
Yes. 
Using non-name 
based identifiers 
not as effective. 
Yes. 
Less restrictive than 
locking up people with 
communicable disease, 
more effective than 
identifiers. 
Yes. 
As long as non-
discriminatory and kept 
as private as possible. 
Yes. 
Preventing disease 
important to 
everyone. 
 
Reporting the 
Medically Unfit 
to Drive 
Yes. 
Removes licenses 
from population 
with 2x more 
accidents. 
Yes. 
Relying on self-
restriction not as 
effective. 
Yes. 
As long as other forms 
of transport are 
available. 
Yes. 
Removing high risk 
population from road 
outweighs 
inconvenience. 
Yes. 
Reduces number 
of car accidents. 
 
Reporting Cases of 
Suspected 
Child Abuse 
Yes. 
Reporting ideally 
leads to child’s 
removal from 
context of abuse. 
Yes. 
Physicians were 
historically 
unwilling to 
report. 
Yes. 
Due process should 
protect against false 
accusations 
Yes. 
Parental autonomy 
does not extend to child 
abuse. 
Yes. 
Especially 
important to 
protect vulnerable 
population. 
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Reporting Illegal 
Drug Use by 
Pregnant Women 
No. 
Drives drug using 
pregnant women 
underground. 
No. 
Ineffectiveness 
removes 
necessity. 
No. 
Less restrictive to offer 
drug treatment. 
No. 
Fetal welfare does not 
outweigh autonomy 
and privacy/trust. 
No. 
Drug using 
pregnant women 
need help, not 
incarceration. 
 
Reporting Mentally 
Ill Individuals 
Considered Likely to 
Commit Violence 
No. 
Targeted 
population not 
responsible for 
significant portion 
of gun violence. 
No. 
Ineffectiveness 
removes 
necessity. 
No. 
Less infringing to 
regulate gun use by all 
owners than to target 
gun ownership right of 
one group. 
No. 
Increase in stigma and 
removal of a right not 
proportional to 
infinitesimal reduction 
in gun violence. 
No. 
Justification for 
targeting mentally 
ill based on 
incorrect 
assumptions. 
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5.0  CONCLUSION 
The new reporting requirement for mental health professionals in the New York SAFE Act is a 
misguided attempt to reduce gun violence. For this reporting requirement to be warranted, it 
would need to be both effective and necessary, which, contrary to fact, would depend on people 
with mental illness perpetrating a large portion of overall gun violence and the ability of mental 
health professionals to accurately predict violence. This difficulty in prediction combined with 
the small number of people who have a mental illness and also commit violence renders this 
approach to reducing overall gun violence ineffective, while at the same time reinforcing 
negative stereotypes about people with mental illness. Because of the high social costs of 
reinforcing these stereotypes, the reporting requirement’s burdens are not proportional to its 
potential benefits. Further, there are less restrictive alternatives that would serve to reduce 
overall gun violence by targeting all gun owners, without making scapegoats of the mentally ill. 
Overall, due to the ineffectiveness of this measure, it is  not able to be justified, particularly to 
those individuals that it affects. 
Would a reporting requirement similar to the one found in the SAFE Act have prevented 
the tragedy at Sandy Hook? According to the final report by Connecticut’s State Attorney, “It is 
known that the shooter had significant mental health issues that affected his ability to live a 
normal life and to interact with others…As an adult he did not recognize or help himself deal 
with those issues. What contribution this made to the shootings, if any, is unknown as those 
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mental health professionals who saw him did not see anything that would have predicted his 
future behavior…Investigators however, have not discovered any evidence that the shooter 
voiced or gave any indication to others that he intended to commit such a crime himself.”120 
120 Office of the State’s Attorney, Judicial District of Danbury, Stephen J. Sedensky III, State’s 
Attorney, Report of the State’s Attorney for the Judicial District of Danbury on the Shootings at 
Sandy Hook Elementary School and 36 Yogananda Street, Newtown, Connecticut on December 
14, 2012, (November 25, 2013), 3. Accessed December 5th, 2013. 
http://www.ct.gov/csao/lib/csao/Sandy_Hook_Final_Report.pdf 
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